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Abstract. — We take advantage of a wave of school constructions in Cameroon
after World War II and use variations in school supply at the village level to estimate
labor and marriage market returns to education in the 1976 population census.
Education increases the likelihood to be in a polygamous union for men and for
women, as well as the overall socioeconomic status of the spouse. We argue that
education increases polygamy for women because it allows them to marry more
educated and richer men, who are more likely to be polygamists. To show this,
we estimate a structural model of marriage with polygamy. The positive affinity
between a man’s polygamy and a woman’s education is mostly explained by the
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1. Introduction
On top of labor market returns, education has marriage market returns: it affects
who you marry, and bargaining power within marriage. In developing countries,
where participation of women in the formal labor market is still low, marriage
is an extremely important economic decision in a woman’s life. An individual’s
education will affect the characteristics of their spouse. In regions where polygamy
is practiced, education will also affect the number of wives (for men), and the
number of co-wives (for women).
Polygamy is still very important in a number of African countries, but it has been
declining in recent decades. The expansion of education might have played a role
— because of the transmission of different cultural norms by colonial schools and
religious missions, because education increased the bargaining power of women,
or because education made men more interested in having few educated children
rather than many children (Gould et al., 2008). However, while education has
been found to impact women’s fertility choices (Osili and Long, 2008; Keats, 2018;
Chicoine, 2016, 2012), attitudes towards domestic violence (Friedman et al., 2016),
and sexual behavior (Dupas, 2011), Fenske (2015) finds that a variety of educa-
tional shocks that increased women education did not decrease their likelihood to
be in a polygamous union. At the same time, the regions that received a lot of
missionaries or government schools during the colonial period have lower rates of
polygamy today (Fenske, 2015). The discrepancy between the two results might
stem from a difference between colonial and current education in the content of
schooling, or in the quality of education.
In this paper, we study the returns to education on the labor and marriage
markets focusing on a late-colonial era wave of school constructions in Cameroon.
After World War II, the colonial governments of British and French Cameroon
considerably increased education expenditure, which resulted in a large increase
in school supply. Though these schools opened during the colonial period, we can
observe the individuals who attended them in Cameroonian census microdata from
1976, geolocated at the village level. Combining these data with recent adminis-
trative data on the universe of schools in Cameroon with their date of opening, we
use variation in the timing of public school openings in different villages to iden-
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tify labor and marriage market returns to education. Our event study shows that
the opening of a school in a village does not predict the education of individuals
too old to go to that school, which validates the common trend assumption. In
a quasi-difference in differences setting, we instrument an individual’s education
by the stock of public schools in their village when they were of school-age condi-
tional on village and cohort fixed effects, and cohort trends interacted with village
observables.
Since the work of Duflo (2001) in Indonesia, using variations in school construc-
tions to study labor market returns to education has been a well known technique.
However, identifying marriage market returns presents two additional challenges.
The first one is that, in a village, potential husbands and wives are subject to
the same educational shock. The fact that, in Cameroon in 1976, the average age
difference between husband and wife was ten years does not completely solve the
problem: if the opening of a school in a village increases the education of a cohort
of men, it will also increase the education of their potential wives. The second chal-
lenge is that the reduced form effect of education on a particular spousal variable
(say, whether your husband is a polygamist) is affected by the effect of education
on the choice of other spousal characteristics (income, age, education), and the
correlation between these variables. Tackling these two challenges requires, we
argue, a structural approach.
We extend the model of marriage with transfers of Choo and Siow (2006) to
allow men to marry several women, and we borrow the parametrization of the
joint utility function of marriage of Dupuy and Galichon (2014). This allows
us to estimate “affinities” between different characteristics of husbands and wives.
These affinities are the second derivatives of the joint utility of the union, and they
describe the likelihood that a man with a given characteristic will be matched to
a woman with a given characteristic, taking into account the affinity between all
other characteristics. We show that the affinity parameters can be recovered by
estimating a multinomial logit on pairs of couples within the same village. We use
a control function approach to take into account the endogeneity of education.
Our reduced-form difference in differences results show that one additional year
of education increases the probability to be a wage earner (be formally employed)
by 3.3 percentage points for women and 10.4 percentage points for men. Education
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reduces slightly the likelihood of marriage for women, and increases it for men,
but not in a statistically significant way. In the sample of married people, educa-
tion increases the socioeconomic outcomes of one’s spouse (education and formal
employment). One additional year of schooling also increases the likelihood to be
in a polygamous union by 9.9 percentage points for men and 6.6 percentage points
for women. While the result for women might appear counter-intuitive, we argue
it is explained by the other dimensions of matching on the marriage market: more
educated women marry richer and more educated men, and these men are also
more often polygamists.
Turning to the structural model, we first estimate the affinity between a hus-
band’s number of wives and a wife’s education, taking into account the matching
on age, but not the matching on education. We replicate our reduced-form result,
that is we estimate a positive affinity between the number of wives of the husband
and the education of the wife. When adding to the affinity matrix the education
of the husband to take into account the matching on education, the affinity be-
tween the husband’s number of wives and the wife’s education is divided by 3 and
loses statistical significance. This shows matching on education is important to
understand the effect of female education on polygamy. Because educated women
can marry more educated men, who are richer and more likely to take a second
wife, they are more likely to end up in a polygamous marriage.
We also provide suggestive evidence that the type of schooling matters, especially
for women. While our main specification uses the variation in public, secular
schools to obtain exogenous variation in education, we find that women who were
exposed to a larger number of private, Christian schools in the village when they
were of school age are less likely to be in a polygamous union in 1976. With
the caveat that our parallel trend test fails when we consider private schools,
this is consistent with the fact that Christians missions in Africa in general, and
Cameroon in particular, were explicitely fighting polygamy and trying to impose
a monogamous model of marriage (Walker-Said, 2015, 2018; Tsoata, 1999).
Contributions. Our paper contributes to the literature on the economics of
polygamy. In societies allowing polygamy, men and women face different incen-
tives than in monogamous societies and adopt different behaviors; this has impli-
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cations for saving rates and economic growth (Tertilt, 2005), for intra-household
cooperation (Barr et al., 2019; Rossi, 2019), and for child mortality (Arthi and
Fenske, 2018).
Our paper contributes more specifically to the literature aiming at understanding
the existence of polygamy, and its decline. A first group of works tries to explain
the existence of polygamous and monogamous societies. Becker (1973) makes
the point that the existence of polygamous unions is the equilibrium outcome
when there is inequality among males. Boserup (1970) proposes that polygamy is
explained by female productivity in agriculture, an idea tested by Jacoby (1995)
in Cote d’Ivoire. Dalton and Leung (2014) argue that the greater prevalence of
polygamy in West Africa is explained by the effect of the Atlantic slave trade on
sex ratios.
A second group of works aims at explaining the dynamics of polygamy. In
Lagerlöf (2005), societies become monogamous as inequality among men falls. In
Lagerlöf (2010), monogamy is modeled as a pacifying institution established by the
elite to avoid the rebellion of poorer men. In such a framework, the relationship
between inequality and polygamy is hump-shaped. De La Croix and Mariani
(2015) propose a unified model of the transition from monogamy to polygamy,
and then to serial monogamy (divorce and remarriage), where income inequality
among men and women plays a key role. Explanations relating the dynamics of
polygamy to the dynamics of inequality are maybe more suited to Europe than
to the recent decline of polygamy in Africa. Indeed, all available evidence points
towards inequality remaining stable (at a high level) in Africa in the last forty years
(Ravaillon, 2014; Alvaredo et al., 2018). Gould et al. (2008) build a model where
the dynamics of economic development, rather than the dynamics of inequality,
explain the decrease in polygamy, as men substitute educated children and wives
for a large number of children and wives.
To the best of our knowledge, the only attempt besides ours to estimate the
causal relationship between education and polygamy for women is Fenske (2015).
We add to it by considering a wave of school constructions during the colonial
period, by considering the effect of education on polygamy for men, and by taking
into account assortative matching on education and the consequence it could have
on reduced-form estimates of the effect of education on polygamy for women.
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We also contribute to the literature on the interplay of labor and marriage mar-
ket returns to education for women. Goldin (1993) studies the changing meaning
of college in the lives of American women over the 20th century. Chiappori et al.
(2015) develop a model where education has both marriage market and labor mar-
ket returns. Fewer papers focus on developing countries, but Zha (2019) studies
the role of education in the marriage market in Indonesia, and Ashraf et al. (forth-
coming) study the role of the bride price custom in explaining whether parents
send their daughters to school in response to a school expansion program. In
Cameroon (where the majority of ethnic groups have some form of bride price)
we find that women’s education increased in response to school constructions and
that education had labor as well as marriage market returns.
Our paper contributes, more generally, to the literature on women empower-
ment and economic development (Duflo, 2012), more specifically the literature
estimating the effect of education on the attitudes and behavior of women. Osili
and Long (2008), Keats (2018), Chicoine (2012) and Chicoine (2016) use schooling
expansion reforms in Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia to show that educa-
tion decreases fertility. In Keats (2018), Chicoine (2012) and Chicoine (2016), this
decrease is partly explained by increased use of contraceptive methods. Dupas
(2011) finds that Kenyan girls informed about the relative risks of HIV infection
by age substitute away from older partners. Friedman et al. (2016) find, also in
Kenya, that girls who prolonged their education as a result of a merit scholarship
program are less likely to accept domestic violence. Like Fenske (2015), we do
not find that women who received education following a wave of public school
constructions are less likely to be in a polygamous union. In fact, in our context,
we find they are more likely to be in a polygamous union, and we show the role
of assortative matching on education in the marriage market in explaining this
result. More generally, we show that taking into account matching is important
when studying the returns to education on the marriage market.
Finally, our paper contributes to the literature on matching models of the mar-
riage market, particularly the branch of this literature concerned with empirical
estimation. Matching models of the marriage market are hard to estimate on data
because prices are typically not observed. Chiappori et al. (2012) estimate a model
where individuals match on a single index aggregating all the characteristics of a
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mate. Choo and Siow (2006) estimate a model of matching on several discrete at-
tributes of men and women, while Dupuy and Galichon (2014) extend the model
to continuous attributes. We extend Choo and Siow (2006) to a setting where men
are allowed to marry several women and we show that, for a given distribution
of female characteristics and a given joint distribution of male characteristics and
their number of spouses, we can identify the second derivatives of the joint utility
function of a match with respect to the characteristics of men and women.
In the rest of the paper, we present the data (section 2), the difference in differ-
ences strategy and the estimated returns to education (section 3), and finally the
model of marriage and the results of the structural estimation (section 4).
2. Data
In order to identify the effect of education on the marriage market in Cameroon,
we use full-count, geolocated population census data from 1976 and geolocated
administrative school data from 2016.
Our main data source is the Cameroonian population census of 1976, for which
we have the whole population, except for 3 districts out of 138 that were missing
in the raw data.1 For each individual, the census gives us sex, age (with some
imprecision in the form of age heaping), education (last grade attended), marital
status (whether an individual is single, divorced, widowed or married — and the
number of wives for men), and some very scarce information about occupation.
Our data does not directly give the line identifier of the spouse for married
individuals, but we were able to match 91.7% of married women with their husband
living in the same household from information on marital status (including the
number of wives for men) and relationship to the household head.2
To obtain information on the stock and flow of schools in every village of
1The districts of Mvengue, Dzeng and Kribi, see figure 1.
2In most households, there was no ambiguity about the pairing of spouses (for instance, a
household with one household head, two spouses of the household head, one married son of
the household and one married other member of the household); however, in large, complex
households, we were not always able to match all spouses (for instance when there were
several married men and several married women listed as “other household members”). This
also means that we were not able to match spouses living in separate households.
7
Figure 1: Villages, districts and provinces in the 1976 census
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Cameroon over the 20th century, we use an administrative database of all Cameroo-
nian schools in 2016 with their status (public or private), their date of opening,
and the name of the locality. Because this is not historical data, it gives us in-
formation about historical school supply insofar as there was no attrition, that is
schools, once opened, did not close down.
In a period of rapid population growth (Cameroon’s population increased sev-
enfold between 1900 and 2014) and ever-expanding school supply, this assumption
seems reasonable, at least for public schools. To show that attrition is not too
much of a problem, we cross validate our source with historical data for the colo-
nial period. We could not find historical data giving the yearly supply of schools
at the sub-national level, let alone at the village level, but the reports sent by
France and Britain to the League of Nations/United Nations give the total num-
ber of schools in Cameroon for the period 1922—1938 and 1948–1957.3 Figure 2
shows the total flow and stock of public schools in Cameroon between 1923 and
1957, according to 2016 administrative data and to historical data. Though there
is some discrepancy, especially before World War II, the two series are reasonably
close to one another. Reassuringly, from the middle of the 1930s onwards, the two
sources agree on the total stock of public schools in Cameroon. If attrition were
a major problem and a large number of public schools had closed between their
opening date and 2016, then the total stock of school given by 2016 administrative
data would be lower than the stock given by historical sources, but it is not the
case. For private (missionary) schools, attrition is much more of a problem: his-
torical data always give far more private schools than what can be inferred from
2016 administrative data. For instance, in 1955, we count 564 private schools in
Cameroon while there were more than 2,000 private schools according to historical
data. That said, the source for the number of private schools in historical data is
the missions themselves, and their figures might be inflated (Dupraz, 2019). How-
ever, while 2016 administrative data seem to give us a reasonably accurate measure
of the historical stock and flow of public schools, we need to think of the private
schools in these data as the ones that were high-quality enough to stay open until
3Sources: Great Britain, Colonial office (1922–1938, 1949–1959); France, Ministère des Colonies
(1921–1938, 1947–1957). French reports also give the number of schools in 1921 and 1947.
Between 1948 and 1959, British reports give only the total number of students; to infer the
total number of schools, we use the average number of students per school in 1938 (110).
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2016.4 This is one of the reasons why we will be using only the variation in the
number of public schools to identify the effects of education on marriage markets.
Figure 2: Comparison of 2016 administrative data with historical data
0
50
10
0
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960
Year
Flow of public schools in our data
Flow of public schools in historical data
Flow of public school openings 1923-1957
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Sources: Great Britain, Colonial office (1922–1938, 1949–1959); France, Ministère des Colonies
(1921–1938, 1947–1957).
We geolocated villages and schools from each database from the name of the
locality, using a variety of gazetteers.5 In the 16 districts of the Bamiléké region,
village-level geolocation was impossible, we therefore excluded from our estima-
tions individuals born in these districts.6 We also excluded from our estimations
individuals born in Yaoundé (the administrative capital) and Douala (the eco-
nomic capital) because of the difficulty to precisely geolocate enumeration areas
within these agglomerations.7 We were able to geolocate 99.9% of the remaining
village in the census and 98.3% of individuals — even though we geolocated almost
4The French report to the UN in 1949 gives the number of private schools with three classes
or more; at about 119, it is reasonably close to the number of private schools that opened
before 1949 in 2016 administrative data (79).
5We used the Fallingrain Global Gazetteer (http://www.fallingrain.com), the GeoNames
geographical database (http://www.geonames.org), the website of the Cameroonian Min-
istry of Energy and Water (http://www.mng-cameroon.org/SIG/)) and the Wiki World
Map OpenStreetMap (https://openstreetmap.org). Geographical information about non-
located villages was inferred by taking the mean of located villages in the same canton (a
canton is a group of about 10 villages).
6These districts represent about 14% of the population. In the Bamilékés, village codes in
the raw data did not match village codes in the locality file. The 16 districts districts are
Mbouda, Batcham, Galim, Bafang, Bana, Bandja, Kekem, Dcshang, Penka-Michel, Bafous-
sam, Bandjoun, Bamendjou, Bangou, Bazou, Tonga and Bangangte.
7These cities represent 8 districts, corresponding to roughly 5% of the population in 1976.
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every village, errors in village code entry prevented geolocation for some individ-
uals. Figure 1 maps these villages as well as the districts where geolocation was
impossible. We geolocated all 3,765 schools in the administrative school database
opened before 1976 from the name of the locality.8 For 40 schools (1.1%) that
could not be geolocated from the name of the locality, we used the centroid of the
district.
Figure 3: Construction of the school supply variable: example
(a) 1940 (b) 1950
Note: A circle represents a 10-km radius around a given village. In 1940, the village of Mbenkoa has zero
schools in a radius of 10 km and the village of Mbaladjap has one (private) school. In 1950, the village of
Mbenkoa has 1 (public) school and the village of Mbaladjap has 3 schools (1 private, 2 public).
Finally, we combined both geolocated sources in a GIS software to build the
stock and flows of schools (total, public and private) in a radius of 10 km around
each village at each date. Figure 3 gives a graphical illustration of the procedure.
The census gives the name of the village of residence and of the district of
birth, but not the name of the village of birth.9 For individuals still residing
in their district of birth, we assume that they were schooled in the village in
which they were living in 1976. We can therefore, for non-migrants, compute the
stock of schools, and the number of school openings at each age. Out-of-district
8We were able to locate the village 3,333 schools. For 392 schools, we use the location of the
town (“ville”), a geographical division larger than the village.
9There were 12,125 villages and 138 districts in Cameroon in 1976, see figure 1.
11
migrants, representing roughly a third of the sample, are excluded from our main
specification. Education, our independent variable of interest, is likely to affect
the decision to migrate: for this reason, we also present results estimated on the
full sample (migrants and non-migrants) where education is instrumented by the
district average number of available schools for non-migrants (see appendix table
C.3).
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for the sample of men and women
older than 15 in 1976: men have 3 years of education on average, versus 1.4 for
women; 17% of men are wage earners, versus only 1% for women. Because of
polygyny, the percentage of married men (56%) is lower than the percentage of
married women (67%). Married women are on average 10 years younger than
their husband. This is important for our identification strategy, because it means
that the opening of a school in a village does not necessarily affect both groups
of potential mates in the same way (see below). This large average age difference
explains why the percentage of widows is much higher among women than men
(14% vs 2%). 44% of married women are in a polygamous union, versus 24% of
men. 71% of polygamists have 2 wives, 19% have 3 wives and 10% have 4 wives
or more. People born before 1940 had on average 0.26 schools in a radius of 10
km around their village when they were 7 (0.12 public and 0.14 private). People
born after 1940 had on average 1.5 public school and 1.25 private school.10
Appendix figure B.1 gives an idea of the geographical repartition of polygamy.
Although there is somewhat of a north/south gradient, polygamy is prevalent
in every district. The share of married women in a polygamous union is below
20% only in a handful of districts around the economic capital (Douala) and the
administrative capital (Yaoundé).
On top of these population census and administrative school data, we use a vari-
ety of other geographical and historical data sources to build village level controls.
These data sources are described in greater detail in the data appendix.
10The slight discrepancy between men and women is due to differences in gender composition
across villages explained by different migration patterns: these figures are computed for non-
migrant only, and men tend to migrate more than women.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Women older than 15 Men older than 15
Mean Observations Mean Observations
Full sample
Age 35.13 1,974,625 35.86 1,754,334
Years of schooling 1.37 1,964,294 2.97 1,747,632
Wage earner 0.01 1,941,572 0.17 1,711,810
Out-of-district migrant 0.30 1,975,117 0.33 1,754,807
Married 0.67 1,966,349 0.56 1,740,155
Single 0.16 1,966,349 0.39 1,740,155
Widow 0.14 1,966,349 0.02 1,740,155
Divorced 0.03 1,966,349 0.03 1,740,155
Married sample
Age 33.12 1,310,614 42.98 975,344
In a polygamous union 0.44 1,184,845 0.24 975,468
# of wives 1.36 970,940
Sample in a polygamous union
# of wives 2.46 236,263
2 wives 0.71 236,263
3 wives 0.19 236,263
4 wives or more 0.10 236,263
Non-migrant sample
(excluding Yaounde, Douala, and the Bamilekes)
Schools in 10-km radius at 7
born before 1940
public 0.12 453,701 0.11 464,053
private 0.14 453,701 0.11 464,053
born after 1940
public 1.48 689,018 1.57 551,207
private 1.25 689,018 1.34 551,207
Sample: all men and women older than 15 in 1976.
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3. Difference in differences estimation
We are interested in the labor market and marriage market returns to education.
The endogeneity concerns in estimating labor market returns to education are
well known. As for marriage market returns, it is extremely likely that a number
of cultural characteristics and personal unobservables determine both educational
choices and marriage market outcomes, especially the probability to be in a polyg-
amous union (Fenske, 2015). Like a number of papers following Duflo (2001),
we take advantage of an expansion in school supply, the wave of primary school
constructions that started in Cameroon after World War II.
3.1. Historical background
After World War I, German Cameroon was divided between the British and the
French and administered under mandates of the League of Nations. In both parts,
before World War II, public expenditure for education was low and Christian mis-
sionaries (Protestant and Catholic) were the main providers of education (Dupraz,
2019). After World War II, education expenditure increased massively in both
parts. In British Cameroon, real expenditure per school-age child was increased
fourfold between 1937 and 1955. In French Cameroon, it was multiplied by 30
(Dupraz, 2019). As the stated goal of education policy went from educating a
small elite to universal primary education, the colonial governments of British and
French Cameroon increased subsidies to missionary schools and started building
more public schools. School constructions continued after both parts of Cameroon
gained independence in 1960 and were reunited in 1961.
The first panel of figure 4 displays the yearly number of school openings in
Cameroon for each year between 1900 and independence in 1960 according to
our administrative data. The yearly number of school openings started increasing
around 1950, going from an average of 16 from 1930 to 1949 to an average of 119
in the 1950s. As a result, the total number of schools in Cameroon was multiplied
by 6 from 1945 (283) to 1960 (1,699) — second panel of figure 4. The yearly
number of public school openings went from an average of 9 from 1930 to 1949 to
an average of 81 in the 1950s, and the total number of public schools in Cameroon
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Figure 4: Stock and flow of public and private schools in Cameroon, 1900-1960
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Note: the bars representing public schools are stacked on the bars representing private schools
so that the graph shows the total number of schools.
was multiplied by 7 from 1945 (158) to 1960 (1,107).
Our analysis will always distinguish between public and private schools. There
are several reasons for this; first, as discussed above, it is likely that our data are
incomplete for private schools, giving us only the schools that were high quality
enough to survive until 2016; second, we have every reason to expect heterogeneous
effects of public and private education on the marriage market, and especially on
polygamy. Before the 1980s, private schools in Cameroon were quasi-exclusively
Christian schools.11 There is ample evidence that African missions were targeting
polygamy specifically and putting a lot of effort in promoting the Christian, monog-
amous model of marriage. Though the French colonial government also sought to
change marriage customs, the African clergy was particularly active in criticizing
elements of marital customs such as bridewealth and polygamy (Walker-Said, 2015,
2018). In Cameroon, Catholic missionaries established “sixas” or “bride schools”
to prepare young girls to a Christian wedding (Tsoata, 1999).
11Non-denominational private schools started opening during the economic crisis of the 1980s
in response to the decreasing quality of public schools, while Islamic primary schools are a
more recent phenomenon.
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3.2. Event study and common trend assumption
To obtain plausibly exogenous variation in the education of men and women, we
use local, village-level variation in the number of schools over time. Our main esti-
mation strategy is a quasi difference in differences, presented in section 3.3 below.
Difference in differences estimates are sensitive to the common trend assumption,
which we test with an event study. This event study estimates the effect of school
openings at different ages. This checks that school constructions increased enroll-
ment only for the children of school age at the date of the school opening. To
put it differently, this checks that school constructions did not take place in areas
with different trends in education (conditional on controls). Estimating a positive
correlation between years of schooling and the opening of a school at age 25 would
indicate that the common trend assumption does not hold and that schools were
more likely to open in villages with an increasing trend in education. We estimate
the following equation:
Eivc = αv+δc+δc×BR+
a=30∑
a=−10
(
βpublic,an
public,a
vc + βprivate,anprivate,avc
)
+x′vcθ+eivc (1)
Eivc is the education (in years) of individual i, born in village v in year c (for
cohort). αv and δc are village and cohort fixed effects. To allow the trend in
education to be different in British Cameroon, we interact the cohort fixed effects
with a dummy BR equal to one in the two Western provinces, which were part of
British Cameroon until independence. npublic,avc is the number of public schools that
opened in village v when an individual born in year c was age a (negative numbers
are years before birth). npublic,−10vc is the stock of public schools 10 years before
birth.12 nprivate,avc is the same for private schools. For example, for individual i born
in 1940 in village v where the only school, public, opened in 1947, npublic,7v,1940 = 1, and
all other school opening variables are equal to zero. We do not consider a > 30,
12We do not consider schools built more than 10 years before birth to make the graph more
readable, which is why npublic,−10vc is the stock, rather than the flow, of schools in the village
10 years before birth: it takes into account all schools opening more than 10 years before
birth.
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individuals who had a school opening after 30 serve as the reference.13 xvc is a
vector of time invariant village controls interacted with a quartic cohort trend (see
below for a more detailed discussion). We estimate equation (1) separately for
men and women. Like in the rest of the paper, standard errors are clustered at
the village level.
Equation (1) is similar to an event study specification, with a couple of differ-
ences: the date of the event (the opening of a school) is not the same in each
village, there can be several events per village, and the effect of the event is esti-
mated for different age cohorts rather than at different time periods. In theory,
Cameroonian children were supposed to attend primary school from 7 to 12, but
the colonial authorities were flexible regarding school entry age: according to a
1950 decree, children could start primary school as late as 10 and enter the final
grade as late as 16.14 Furthermore, parents might have bypassed official regu-
lations to allow their children to benefit from the opening of a school in their
village.15 There is also some error in age in the census, notably in the form of age
heaping (see appendix figure B.2). We therefore expect school openings to have
a positive effect on education before age 7, but also to a certain extent between
8 and 16 (because of late school entry, and because the opening of an additional
school can alleviate capacity constraints in an existing school). However, school
openings after 17 should not be correlated with education. Because individuals
who had a school opening after 30 serve as the reference group, this is similar to
a test of parallel trend in a more classical difference in differences setting.
In estimating equation (1), and in the rest of the paper, we consider only the
schools that opened during the colonial period, before 1960. These are the schools
that mattered for the individuals we consider in the rest of the paper (older than
25 in 1976, born before 1951). All results of the paper are barely affected when
we also consider schools that opened after 1960, but the parallel trend test fails
for schools built after independence (see below).
13If we were to consider all a > 30, the sum of every npublic,avc would be the number of public
schools, a constant at the village level, and would be captured by the village fixed effects.
14Arrêté du 27 juillet 1950 reproduced in France, Ministère des Colonies (1950). Rapport annuel
du Gouvernement Français à l’Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies sur l’administration du
Cameroun placé sous la tutelle de la France.
15In the 1976 census, 46% of boys and 38% of girls in the first year of primary are older than 10.
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Figure 5: Event study graphs: effect of public school openings on education
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Note: Both figures display the βpublic coefficients of equation (1), estimated separately for men
and women. The βprivate are estimated jointly, but presented on a different graph for
readability (appendix figure C.1). Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
Figure 5 displays the β associated with public education, for men and women
separately. Schools opening before 7 increase education of both men and women.
The effect is larger and more precisely estimated for women than for men. If, when
a public school opened in a village, some boys were already attending private
school while girls were not, we would expect the opening of a public school to
matter more for girls’ education. Schools opening between 8 and 12 also increase
education, but the magnitude is lower for women. Schools opening after 12 have
no positive effect on education. The estimated effect is very slightly negative for
women (see discussion below). The picture is similar for private schools (appendix
figure C.1).
Appendix figure C.2 displays event study graphs for men and women when we
also consider post-colonial schools (opened after 1960). These graphs are very
similar to figure 5, but there is a significant (though small) correlation between
years of education and the number of public schools built in the village when
an individual was between 20 and 30. This is likely because, in the postcolonial
period, school supply reacted to local demand and educated parents of school age
children were able to lobby for more schools. For this reason, we never consider
schools built after 1960 in the rest of the paper. This hardly matters for our results
18
because we only consider individuals older than 25, who were born before 1951.
Next, we present event study results in a more compact way and we test more
formally the parallel trend assumption that schools opening after 17 are not posi-
tively correlated with education or labor/marriage market outcomes. We estimate
the following equation:
Eivc = γ1Npublic,7vc + γ2npublic,8−12vc + γ3npublic,13−16vc + γ4npublic,17−22vc
+ φ1Nprivate,7vc + φ2nprivate,8−12vc + φ3nprivate,13−16vc + φ4nprivate,17−22vc
+ αv + δc + δc ×BR + x′vcθ + eivc
where Npublic,7vc is the stock of public schools in village v when individual i was
7, and npublic,a−bvc is the number of public school openings between ages a ad b.16
γ4 and φ4 test the parallel trend assumption for, respectively, public and private
schools. If γ4 = 0, then individuals aged 17–22 at the opening of a school were
not more educated than in a village where no school opened. γ3 and φ3 should
be small, but might be positive if there is late school entry and measurement
error in age. We estimate equation (2) not only for education, but also for a
labor market outcome (the probability to be a wage earner) and for the number
of spouses (for men) and co-spouses (for women). It should be noted that, for
marriage market outcomes, we might estimate γ4 and φ4 different from zero even
if the parallel trend assumption is valid because of general equilibrium effects on
local marriage markets. If the building of a school makes women who were young
enough to attend school relatively more attractive on the local marriage market,
it also makes women who were too old to attend school relatively less attractive.17
Table 2 displays the coefficients of equation (2) for women. An additional public
school in the village at 7 increases schooling by 0.11 years and the probability to
be a wage earner by 0.46 percentage points. It also increases the number of co-
spouses by 0.02. This is the central result of the paper: a positive education
shock makes women more, not less likely to enter a polygamous union. Public
16Nprivate,7vc and nprivate,a−bvc are the same for private schools.
17The same general equilibrium argument can be applied to labor market outcomes, but labor
markets are typically larger than marriage markets, which makes the problem less important.
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Table 2: Effect of school constructions after 17, women
(1) (2) (3)
Years of Wage Nb. of
schooling earner co-spouses
# public schools at 7 0.1110*** 0.0046*** 0.0185**
(0.0167) (0.0013) (0.0081)
# public sch. openings 8-12 0.0331*** 0.0020** -0.0014
(0.0122) (0.0009) (0.0064)
# public sch. openings 13-16 -0.0087 -0.0001 0.0029
(0.0094) (0.0006) (0.0065)
# public sch. openings 17-22 -0.0166*** -0.0002 -0.0055
(0.0057) (0.0004) (0.0057)
# private schools at 7 0.1019*** 0.0038*** -0.0515***
(0.0171) (0.0012) (0.0135)
# private sch. openings 8-12 0.0166 0.0016* -0.0410***
(0.0119) (0.0008) (0.0132)
# private sch. openings 13-16 -0.0183** 0.0011 -0.0320***
(0.0091) (0.0006) (0.0121)
# private sch. openings 17-22 -0.0167** 0.0005 -0.0324***
(0.0071) (0.0005) (0.0110)
Village F.E. X X X
Cohort F.E. X X X
Cohort F.E. × Br. Cameroon X X X
Village controls × cohort quartic trend X X X
Observations 700,986 388,424 492,816
Sample: in column (1), all non-migrant women aged 25–60 in 1976; in column
(2), all non-migrant working women 25–60; in column (3), all non-migrant mar-
ried women 25–60. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
schools did not open in villages that already had a positive trend in education: the
coefficient on the number of public school openings between 17 and 22 is actually
negative, though small (−0.016), which might be the sign that public schools were
opening in villages with a slight negative trend in female education. This does not
threaten our identification in an economically significant way. Though this means
the coefficient of the first stage might be attenuated, the attenuation bias would
be small (−0.016 years is only 1/7th of the effect of public schools at 7). Besides,
public schools did not open in villages that had a positive trend in polygamy
(the effect of school openings between 17 and 22 on the number of co-spouses is
20
negative, small, and not statistically significant). The coefficient of the reduced
form on polygamy has therefore no reason to be biased, but the coefficient of the
IV-estimation might be biased upwards for women (because the first stage might
be biased), but by no more than a few percent.
Results for the opening of a private school are remarkably similar for education
and the probability of being a wage earner, but they are very different for the
number of co-spouses. An additional private school in the village at 7 decreases
the number of co-spouses by 0.5. Given that Christian schools in Cameroon were
fighting polygamy actively (Walker-Said, 2015, 2018; Tsoata, 1999), one natural
interpretation of this result is that Christian and secular education have very dif-
ferent effects on the marriage market. However, we find evidence that the parallel
trend assumption does not hold in the case of private, Christian schools. The
opening of a Christian school in the village between 17 and 22 is associated with
0.3 fewer co-wives, which means that Christian schools were opening in village
were polygamy was already declining, probably because these were already Chris-
tianized villages.
Table 3 displays the coefficients of equation (2) for men. Results are similar as
for women, with a couple of important differences: an additional public school in
the village at 7 increases education by 0.6 years (versus 0.11 for women), maybe
because boys were more likely to be already enrolled in a private school; the number
of schools opening between 13 and 16 increases education and the number of co-
spouses, maybe because boys were more likely than girls to start school late.18
Men who had access to a private school at 7 have more spouses, not less, but the
parallel trend assumption seems to be violated: private schools opened in villages
with a positive trend in wage labor (column 2).
18The magnitude of the effect on the number of spouses is important (0.06 wives). This might
be explained by the fact that, in the cohort of boys theoretically too old to enter school when
a new school opened, the few who attended school enjoyed a particularly big advantage on
the marriage market later in life, while those who obtained education along with the rest of
their cohort had to compete with other educated men.
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Table 3: Effect of school constructions after 17, men
(1) (2) (3)
Years of Wage Nb. of
schooling earner co-spouses
# public schools at 7 0.0572*** 0.0109*** 0.0112**
(0.0158) (0.0027) (0.0047)
# public sch. openings 8-12 0.0524*** 0.0014 0.0096***
(0.0112) (0.0014) (0.0036)
# public sch. openings 13-16 0.0143 0.0019 0.0066**
(0.0103) (0.0015) (0.0033)
# public sch. openings 17-22 0.0012 0.0006 0.0018
(0.0085) (0.0011) (0.0031)
# private schools at 7 0.0847*** 0.0134*** 0.0170**
(0.0200) (0.0022) (0.0071)
# private sch. openings 8-12 0.1005*** 0.0123*** 0.0065
(0.0202) (0.0022) (0.0058)
# private sch. openings 13-16 0.0330** 0.0063*** 0.0077
(0.0167) (0.0019) (0.0063)
# private sch. openings 17-22 0.0233 0.0081*** 0.0078
(0.0146) (0.0017) (0.0062)
Village F.E. X X X
Cohort F.E. X X X
Cohort F.E. × Br. Cameroon X X X
Village controls × cohort quartic trend X X X
Observations 608,454 560,301 471,841
Sample: in column (1), all non-migrant men aged 25–60 in 1976; in column
(2), all non-migrant working men 25–60; in column (3), all non-migrant mar-
ried men 25–60. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
3.3. First stage and reduced form
To estimate the labor and marriage market returns to education, we use the stock of
public schools in the village when an individual was of school age as an instrument
for education. In a first stage, we estimate the following equation:
Eivc = αv + δc + δc ×BR + γNpublic,avc + x′vcθ + εivc (2)
where the excluded instrument Npublic,avc is the stock of public schools in village
v when individual i was age a. We choose the age a that maximizes the first stage
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F-test of the excluded instrument. This age is 7 for women, and 13 for men (see
appendix figure C.3). As discussed above, the reason why schools opening after 7
seem to matter more for men than for women is that late school entry is a more
common phenomenon for men.19 As a robustness, we also present results where
we use the same excluded instruments for men and women: the stock of schools
at 7, and the number of schools opening between 8 and 12 (see appendix tables
C.1 and C.2 and discussion below). Like in equation 1 αv and δc are village and
cohort fixed effects, and BR is a binary equal to one in the two Western provinces,
which were part of British Cameroon until independence. xvc is a vector of time
invariant village controls interacted with a quartic cohort trend.
The village fixed effects capture any village characteristic correlated with both
education and school constructions. One might be worried, for example, that
more schools are built in urban areas where the returns to education are larger.
Controlling for village fixed effects will be perhaps even more important in the
second stage, when we will put marriage market outcomes on the left-hand side.
Fenske (2015) shows that, in a number of African surveys, the negative correlation
between polygamy and education is largely explained by geographical controls
correlated negatively with education and positively with polygamy. The cohort
fixed effects ensure that we will not interpret a spurious correlation between an
increasing trend in education (or a declining trend in polygamy) and an increasing
trend in school supply. The cohort fixed effects are interacted with the British
Cameroon binary to allow for a different trend in regions subjected to a different
colonial rule. Because of the village fixed effects, our identification comes from
within-village differences between age groups. However, villages sharing similar
observable characteristics may have similar histories, and this may be related to
trends in school construction. This is why our specification includes the vector xvc
of time-invariant village controls interacted with cohort trends.20 The village-level
controls are precipitation, temperature, elevation, ruggedness, a malaria stability
index and agricultural suitability, distance to the nearest 1922 railroad, river,
19In the 1976 census, 46% of boys in the first year of primary are older than 10 versus 38% for
women.
20We use a quartic cohort polynomial, which is less computationally demanding than interacting
the village controls with the vector of cohort fixed effects (but we show below that the two
approaches give very similar results).
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1922 town, Roome mission station, 1913 German mission school, and 1913 German
government school (see data appendix).21 The vector xvc also contains the number
of private, Christian schools in the village at a. The stock of private schools is
not used as an excluded instrument, because the parallel trend assumption is
less credible for private schools, but we include it as control to take into account
potential complementarity or substitution between private and public schools.22
Equation (2) is a quasi difference in differences specification. It would be a DD
specification if Npublic,avc were a binary variable. Our estimate of interest would then
be the difference in the education gap of young and old cohorts between villages
where a school opened and villages where no school opened. In equation (2), we
also use the difference in the education gap of young and old cohorts between
villages where N schools opened and villages where only N − 1 schools opened.23
Table 4: First stage and reduced form for women
Dep. var.: years of education Dep. var.: # of co-wives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
# public schools at 7 0.1344*** 0.1102*** 0.1068*** 0.1084*** 0.0167*** 0.0178*** 0.0169** 0.0196***
(0.0163) (0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0131) (0.0063) (0.0067) (0.0069) (0.0068)
# private schools at 7 0.1376*** 0.1095*** 0.1096*** 0.0956*** -0.0290*** -0.0295*** -0.0303*** -0.0259***
(0.0140) (0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0141) (0.0083) (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0087)
Village F.E. X X X X X X X X
Cohort F.E. X X X X X X X X
Cohort F.E. × Br. Cameroon X X X X X X
Village ctrls × cohort trend X X
Village ctrls × cohort quartic X X X X
Village ctrls × cohort F.E. X X
Cohort F.E. × province F.E. X X
Observations 700,986 700,986 700,986 700,986 492,816 492,816 492,816 492,816
Sample: in columns (1) to (4), all non-migrant women aged 25–60 in 1976; in columns (5) to (8), all non-migrant married women
25–60. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Table 4 displays the results of the first stage and of the reduced form on the
21Jedwab et al. (2018) have shown that historical mission atlases such as Roome (1925) tend to
report only selected mission locations, hence the importance of also using the data on mission
schools in Schlunk (1914), digitized by Dupraz (2019).
22If public and private schools are substitutes, the government might build less public schools
in villages that already have private schools. The government might also build more public
schools in villages that already have private schools and where the demand for education is
high.
23In our sample of women, 72% had no school in the village at 7, 20% had 1 school, 5% had
2 schools, and 3% had 3 schools or more, with a maximum of 11 schools. In our sample of
men, 62% had no school in the village at 13, 22% had 1 school, 8% had 2 schools, and 8%
had 3 schools or more, with a maximul of 12 schools.
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number of co-wives for women. Column (1) is a simplified specification, where
the village controls are interacted with a linear, rather than quartic, cohort trend.
One additional school in the village at 7 increases education by 0.13 years of
education. Column (2) is our preferred specification, where we interact the village
controls with a quartic cohort trend: the coefficient drops slightly, to 0.11 years
of education. It then remains very similar when we interact the village controls
with the full vector of cohort fixed effects in column (3), which shows that this
computationally demanding estimation is not required. In column (4), we interact
the vector of cohort fixed effects with a vector of province fixed effects (there
were 7 provinces in Cameroon in 1976, see figure 1), and the coefficient on the
stock of public schools at 7 is barely affected. This reassures us that our first
stage is capturing the causal effect of school supply on education rather than a
spurious correlation between trends in education and province specific trends in
school constructions. Columns (5) to (8) display the results of the reduced form:
an additional public school in the village at 7 increases the number of co-wives by
about 0.02 (while an additional private school decreases the number of co-wives
by about 0.03). Table 5 displays the results of the first stage and of the reduced
form on the number of wives for men. An additional public school at 13 increases
education by about 0.05 years and the number of wives by about 0.01.
Table 5: First stage and reduced form for men
Dep. var.: years of education Dep. var.: # of wives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
# public schools at 13 0.0464*** 0.0510*** 0.0504*** 0.0560*** 0.0081*** 0.0089*** 0.0090*** 0.0120***
(0.0100) (0.0098) (0.0099) (0.0089) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029)
# private schools at 13 0.0831*** 0.0790*** 0.0781*** 0.0655*** 0.0097** 0.0101** 0.0100** 0.0116***
(0.0156) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0144) (0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0044)
Village F.E. X X X X X X X X
Cohort F.E. X X X X X X X X
Cohort F.E. × Br. Cameroon X X X X X X
Village ctrls × cohort trend X X
Village ctrls × cohort quartic X X X X
Village ctrls × cohort F.E. X X
Cohort F.E. × province F.E. X X
Observations 608,454 608,454 608,454 608,454 471,841 471,841 471,841 471,841
Sample: in columns (1) to (4), all non-migrant men aged 25–60 in 1976; in columns (5) to (8), all non-migrant married men 25–60.
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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3.4. 2SLS results
We use our first stage to instrument for education in the following equation:
yivc = αv + δc + δc ×BR + τEivc + x′vcφ+ νivc (3)
where yivc can be an individual’s own labor market outcome (like the probability
to be in the labor force or be a wage earner) or marriage market outcome (like the
number of wives/co-wives, or education of the spouse).
As emphasized in sections 3.2 and 3.3, these estimations solve most endogeneity
issues: our event study shows that the effect of school construction is not explained
by pre-trends in education, and our estimation controls for a potential correlation
between age trends and observable village characteristics. However, two additional
concerns remain.
First, for the exclusion restriction to be met, it must be the case that school
constructions affect outcome yivc only through the own education of individual i.
But when we estimate assortative matching on education (does your own education
causes you to choose a more educated spouse), we need to bear in mind that
the construction of a school in your village also affects the education of your
potential mates. If husbands and wives always had the same age, then we could not
disentangle the effect of assortative mating from the effect of school construction
on education. In Cameroon around independence, individuals did not typically
marry within the same age group — husbands were on average 10 years older than
their wives (see table 1). However, the stock of schools when an individual was of
school age and the stock of schools when their potential mates were of school age
are very correlated. This is one additional motivation to use a structural model:
the model we present and estimate in section 4 below allows us to estimate the
affinity between polygamy and education taking into account assortative mating
on age.
Second, selective migrations are another threat to the validity of the exclusion
restriction. In equations (2) and (3), Npublic,avc is the stock of public schools at age
a in the village where the person lives in 1976. As we know the district of birth
of individuals, we can exclude out-of district migrants from the sample (about
30% of men and women). However, if education affects the decision to migrate,
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then our sample might be selected. To alleviate these concerns, we also present
a specification on the full sample, including migrants, with an instrument at the
district level (see appendix table C.3 and discussion in section 3.5 below).
We start by estimating labor market returns to education, as well as the effect of
education on the extensive margin of marriage (this is crucial because we run our
main results on polygamy are obtained on the sample of married individuals only).
In table 6, panels A and B (for men and for women), we present both the results
of an OLS estimation with cohort and village fixed effects and the results of our
2SLS estimation. Unfortunately, the census does not give information on income,
but it gives information on employment status. We do not estimate statistically
significant effects of education on the probability to be in the labor force (column
1). Conditional on being in the labor force, education increases the likelihood to be
employed in the formal sector and earn a wage by 3 percentage points for women
and 10 percentage points for men, which seems to indicate that labor market
returns to education are higher for men (table 6, column 2). Education seems to
slightly decrease the likelihood to have ever been married for women (−0.02) and
increase it for men (0.04), but these effects are not statistically different from zero
in the 2SLS specification (column 3). Surprisingly, educated men seem more likely
to be widowed, but the small coefficient of 0.014 is significant at the 10% level
only (column 4). Finally, education seems to make women 2.6 percentage points
less likely to have divorced, but the effect is, again, barely statistically significant
(columns 5).
We then focus on the sample of married individuals (table 7). Education in-
creases the socioeconomic status of a spouse. For women, one additional year of
education increases their husband’s education by 0.56 years and the likelihood that
their husband is a wage earner by 7.7 percentage points (panel A, columns 1 and
2).24 For men, one additional year of education increases the average education of
their wives by 1.34 years (panel B, column 1). These might be the combined result
of matching and the school construction shock affecting the education of potential
mates. This is one reason for wanting to estimate assortative mating on education
in a structural model that also takes into account matching on age.
24We do not present the result on whether wives are wage-earners because only 1% of women
are wage earners (see table 1).
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Table 6: Results of 2sls estimation: labor market and extensive margin of marriage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: women
In labor Wage Ever
force earner married Widow Divorced
OLS (with cohort and village fixed effects)
Years of schooling -0.001 0.020*** -0.023*** -0.007*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
2SLS (instrument=# public schools at 7)
Years of schooling -0.028 0.033*** -0.018 -0.030 -0.026*
(0.033) (0.008) (0.014) (0.021) (0.015)
K-P F-stat 59.20 86.44 59.59 59.59 59.59
Observations 696,119 386,450 698,736 698,736 698,736
# clusters 9,213 7,307 9,214 9,214 9,214
Panel B: men
In labor Wage Ever
force earner married Widow Divorced
OLS (with cohort and village fixed effects)
Years of schooling 0.003*** 0.037*** 0.009*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
2SLS (instrument=# public schools at 13)
Years of schooling 0.024 0.104*** 0.040 0.014* -0.003
(0.015) (0.034) (0.037) (0.007) (0.011)
K-P F-stat 26.45 29.68 28.43 28.43 28.43
Observations 604,931 558,430 604,670 604,670 604,670
# clusters 9,203 9,166 9,201 9,201 9,201
Sample: all non-migrant men/women aged 25-60 in 1976. Standard errors
clustered at the village level in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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One additional year of schooling increases the likelihood to be in a polygamous
union by 9.9 percentage points for men, and by 6.6 percentage points for women
(column 4). Men’s number of wives increases by 0.18 while women’s number of
co-wives increases by 0.22 (column 4). Interestingly, there is no effect of education
on a wife’s rank within marriage (column 5).25 It could indicate that educated
women are not entering marriages as second or third wives, but are marrying as
first wives men who then go on to marry more women. Women who received one
additional year of education are married to younger men (by one and a half year),
but there is no effect of education on average spousal age for men (column 6).
For men, the result on polygamy is not too surprising: if education increases the
attractiveness of men on the marriage market (if only because of very large labor
market returns), then it should give men the opportunity to marry more women in
a society allowing polygamy. Even without instrumenting for education, the cor-
relation between education and polygamy conditional on village and cohort fixed
effects is positive and statistically significant for men, tough small (0.3 percentage
points, panel B, column 3).
The fact that education increases the likelihood to be in a polygamous union
for women is more surprising. If education makes women more attractive on the
marriage market, and if women prefer to marry men with fewer co-wives, then we
would expect education to decrease polygamy for women. But what we estimate
with our 2sls strategy is a reduced form result, which is the combined effect of
matching on many characteristics. If educated women marry more educated men
and educated men are more likely to be polygamous, then our positive reduced
form effect might mask a negative affinity between female education and polygamy.
In order to explore this possibility, we turn to a structural model of the marriage
market in section 4 below. A structural model also has the advantage of taking
matching on age into account.
Before turning to the structural model, we present a couple of robustness ex-
ercises. Appendix tables C.1 and C.2 display results obtained by using the same
instruments for men and women: the stock of schools in the village at 7, and the
number of schools opening between 8 and 12. Results are overall very similar, but
25The rank within marriage is not given by the census directly: we infer it from age. Therefore,
a women is given rank one if she is the oldest co-wife, rank 2 if she is the second oldest, etc.
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Table 7: Results of 2sls estimation: sample of married individuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: women
Husband’s Husband Husband Husband’s Wife Husband’s
education wage earner polygamous # of wives rank age
OLS (with cohort and village fixed effects)
Years of schooling 0.603*** 0.033*** -0.011*** -0.018*** -0.029*** -0.539***
(0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.017)
2SLS (instrument=# public schools at 7)
Years of schooling 0.558*** 0.077*** 0.066** 0.221*** -0.003 -1.613***
(0.112) (0.016) (0.030) (0.083) (0.075) (0.581)
K-P F-stat 79.29 86.36 79.03 79.03 80.53 80.05
Observations 491,152 451,030 490,045 490,045 498,101 491,806
# clusters 9,040 8,985 9,039 9,039 9,074 9,042
Panel B: men
Wife(s)’s Number of Wife(s)’s
education Polygamous wives age
OLS (with cohort and village fixed effects)
Years of schooling 0.286*** 0.003*** 0.008*** -0.336***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.013)
2SLS (instrument=# public schools at 13)
Years of schooling 1.339*** 0.099** 0.181** 0.344
(0.246) (0.039) (0.070) (0.549)
K-P F-stat 26.24 25.89 25.71 25.85
Observations 438,328 472,341 470,247 439,070
# clusters 9,041 9,093 9,091 9,043
Sample: all non-migrant men/women aged 25-60 in 1976. Standard errors clustered at the village
level in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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the K-P F-stat of the excluded instruments is lower than in tables 6 and 7.
3.5. Migration
In our main specification, we instrument education by the stock of public schools
at age a in the village where the individual lives in 1976, excluding people who
migrated out of their district of birth (about 30% of the sample). If education
affects the decision to migrate, then our sample might be selected. More precisely,
we might be worried that the men and women who decide to migrate when they
receive education have specific preferences with respect to, for example, polygamy.
If women and men with a strong distaste for polygamy migrate when they ob-
tain education, then part of the positive effect of education on polygamy could be
explained by migration. In appendix table C.3, we present the results of a spec-
ification where we use as an instrument the district average number of available
schools at a in the district of birth. More precisely, our first stage becomes
Eidc = αd + δc + δc ×BR + γN¯public,adc + x′dcφ+ eidc (4)
αd are district fixed effects. N¯public,adc is the average at the district level of Npublic,avc
on the sample of non-migrants (a is 7 for women and 13 for men). The vector xdc
contains all variables in the vector xvc averaged at the district level (there are 112
district). Standard errors are clustered at the district level. Because the census
gives the district of birth of everyone, migrants and non-migrants, we can estimate
this model on the sample of non-migrants and on the full sample. This is shown in
appendix table C.3. The first thing to note is that an additional year of education
greatly increases the likelihood to migrate (by 7 percentage points for women and
31 percentage points for men — column 1). However, our main IV estimates are
remarkably similar in the full sample and in the selected sample of non-migrants.
For example, the effect of education on the number of co-wives is slightly lower in
the full sample (0.17) than in the sample of non-migrants only (0.21), but the two
coefficients are not statistically different from one another (column 6). For men,
we obtain very similar effects in both samples (and in line with our benchmark
village-level results) but they are very imprecisely estimated, and the K-P F-stat
of the excluded instrument is always lower than 10.
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4. Structural estimation of marriage market
returns to education
In Cameroon in the late colonial period, receiving public, non-religious education
increased a woman’s likelihood to be in a polygamous union. But women who had
the opportunity to go to school also married men with a higher socio-economic
status (more educated, more likely to be wage earners). Men with a higher socio-
economic status were more likely to be polygamous: is this why educated women
were more likely to be polygamous? We also want to take into account matching
on age and the fact that the educational shock we use to instrument for education
also affects the education of potential mates. To disentangle all these effects, we
want to estimate marriage market returns to education on a given characteristic
of the marriage taking all other characteristics of the marriage as given. To do
so, we consider a matching model of marriage whose parameters can be estimated
on data. We extend the model of Choo and Siow (2006) to polygamous marriages
and we adopt the joint utility parametrization of Dupuy and Galichon (2014). We
estimate “affinities” between the characteristics of husbands and wives in a match.
These affinities describe the likelihood of observing a match where a husband and
a wife have certain attributes (for example, the man is a polygamist, the woman
is educated) taking into account the matching between all other attributes.
We show that the strong affinity between a man’s polygamy and a wife’s ed-
ucation is almost entirely explained by assortative matching on education. The
positive affinity between a wife education and her husband’s number of wives be-
comes insignificant when we allow for matching on education.
4.1. A matching model of the marriage market
In the standard structural model of matching with transferable utility of Choo
and Siow (2006) or Dupuy and Galichon (2014), men with a set of attributes x
marry women with a set of attributes y. We generalize the model of Choo and
Siow (2006) to the polygamous case.26
26In Choo and Siow (2006), the attributes of men and women are discrete. Dupuy and Galichon
(2014) show a generalization to continuous attributes in the monogamous case.
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Our model has women and men choosing partners to maximize their utility.
In reality, in the context of Cameroon before 1976, it might be more realistic to
envision marriage as a match between two families. The weight of her family in
a woman’s marriage market decisions was likely particularly important. One can
understand the utility functions in our model as applying to the whole family of
the man or woman — but we do not explicitly model the strategic interactions
within the bride or groom’s families.
A manm of characteristics xm = xmarrying a set of womenW = {w1, . . . , wnY +1}
of characteristics Y = {y1, . . . , ynY +1} gets utility27
U(m,W ) = U(x, Y ) + εmY =
∑
y∈Y
u(x, y, nY ) + εmY (5)
U(x, Y ) is the systematic part of the utility, and is assumed to be additively
separable in the utility given by each match with a woman of characteristics y. The
utility of a match with a given wife is also allowed to depend on the number of co-
wives nY . The model has transferable utility: husband and wife can transfer utility
to one another to compensate for some characteristics. These utility transfers play
the role of prices, but are unobserved by the econometrician.28 U(x, Y ) is the
utility post transfers. εmY is a randomly drawn “sympathy shock” for each set of
spouses Y . Each man m is therefore allowed to have idiosyncratic preferences for
his wives’ characteristics Y , but not preferences for individual women. εmY follows
a Gumbel distribution, and is independent between Y .
A woman w with characteristics yw = y marries a man m of characteristics
xm = x and nY other wives. She gets utility:
V(m,nY , w) = v(x, nY , y) + ηwxnY (6)
v(x, nY , y) is the systematic part of the utility which depends on the characteristics
of the man x, of the woman y, and on the number of co-wives. ηwxnY is a randomly
drawn “sympathy shock” of woman w for men of type x with nY co-spouses. ηwxnY
27We will later use the notation nY for the number of co-wives, so nY + 1 is the total number of
wives. In a monogamous marriage, nY = 0.
28In the context of Cameroon, marriage is associated with an actual price, the bride price, but
we do not observe it.
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follows a Gumbel distribution and is independent between (x, nY ). Each woman
w is therefore allowed to have idiosyncratic preferences for the husband’s charac-
teristics x and the number of co-wives nY , but not for the characteristics of the
co-wives. This explains why v depends on nY but not on the characteristics of
the co-wives. If the systematic part of utility v depended on the characteristics
of the co-wives while the sympathy shock η did not, then every woman of a given
type y would prefer the same type of marriage (x, nY , Y ), and women of type y
would never choose other marriages (x, nY , Y ′). Therefore at equilibrium, v de-
pends only on nY (and x) if η depends only on nY (and x). Though, to the best of
our knowledge, no paper has investigated the importance of the characteristics of
co-wives in a woman’s choice of a husband, recent work has studied strategic inter-
actions between co-wives in polygamous marriages: Barr et al. (2019) use public
good games in Nigerian households to show that polygynous husbands and wives
and co-wives, one with another, are less cooperative than monogamous husbands
and wives. Rossi (2019) shows that, in Senegal, women in a polygamous union
strategically increase fertility in response to an increase by a co-wife. Our model
does not prevent women to have preferences over the characteristics of co-wives
(women might prefer to enter a marriage with a co-wife who is older, or more
educated), but it does prevent women to have idiosyncratic preferences over the
characteristics of co-wives. This is a crucial simplifying assumption that allows us
to extend the model to polygamy.
Because the sympathy shocks εmY and ηwxnY are i.i.d. and follow a Gumbel dis-
tribution, the distribution of men’s wives pi(Y |x) and the distribution of women’s
husbands pi(x, nY |y) both follow a mulitnomial logit at the equilibrium (McFadden,
1974):
pi(Y |x) = exp (U(x, Y ))∑
Y ′∈Y exp (U(x, Y ′))
(7)
pi(x, nY |y) = exp (v(x, y, nY ))∑
x′∈X ,n′Y ∈IN exp (v(x
′, y, nY ))
(8)
Equations (7) and (8) are compatible. To show this, we follow the literature and
define an equilibrium as a situation where for every (x, y, nY ), the number of men
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of type x who choose to marry a spouse of type y with nY other spouses equals
the number of women willing to accept this situation. In other words, if f and g
are the distribution of men’s types and of women’s types, for every (x, y, n):
g(x)
∑
Y |nY =n,y∈Y
pi(Y |x) = f(y)pi(x, nY |y) (9)
Theorem 1. For any (implicitly transferable) utility functions following (5) and
(6), and for any distribution of female and males attributes, there is an equilibrium
following both (7) and (8).
The proof of theorem 1 is given in appendix D. We then characterize the equi-
librium:
Lemma 1. If we assume the chances to marry a spouse of type y are small for
any number of spouses nY , the matching function can be written
pi(x, y, nY ) = exp
(
Φ(x, y, nY )− b(y)− a(x, nY )
2
)
(10)
where Φ(x, y, nY ) = u(x, y, nY )+v(x, y, nY ) is the total systematic utility generated
by a match (x, y, nY ).
The proof of lemma 1 is given in appendix D.
Unlike in the monogamous case, we do not prove fully the unicity of the equi-
librium. Theorem 2 (proof in appendix D) shows that for a given distribution of
female characteristics, and male characteristics and their number of spouses, there
can be no more than one equilibrium, which follows (10).29
Theorem 2. For every distribution of female types g(y) and for every joint dis-
tribution of males types and of their number of spouses f(x, nY ), there is at most
one equilibrium, which is the unique distribution following the density (10).
Observing the distribution of marriages allows identification of the joint utility Φ
up to two separatively additive functions b(y) and a(x, nY ). What can be identified
29Theoretically, there might be several possible distributions of the number of spouses at equi-
librium, though we did not find any theoretical examples of multiple equilibria.
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here are the second derivatives of Φ with respect to the characteristics of men
and women. Because it appears in the function a(x, nY ) but not in the function
b(y), the number of co-wives can be considered as a husband characteristic. To
make this clearer, we adopt the notation x = (x, nY ). We then adopt the simple
parametrization of Dupuy and Galichon (2014): Φ(x, y) = x′Ay, where A is a
dx × dy matrix (dx and dy are respectively the number of attributes of x and y).
A is the Hessian of Φ: ∂2Φ
∂x∂y = A.
What can be identified from observing the distribution of marriages are the
elements axy of the affinity matrix A. Let us consider as an example axE ,yE , the
affinity between the education of husband and wife. It is the second derivative
of the joint utility of the match with respect to education of the husband and
education of the wife. If we assume that education of the wife increases the joint
utility of the match, then axE ,yE > 0 means that the increase in utility brought by
the education of the wife is higher in marriages where the husband is educated.
Because individual are maximizing their utility, it also means that we are more
likely to observe a match between an educated man and an educated woman than
a match between an educated man and an uneducated woman.30 Each affinity
takes as given the affinity between all other characteristics of the match.
Only the distribution of marriages is used for identification, and singles do not
contribute to the estimation. This is because the multinomial logit framework used
by Dupuy and Galichon (2014) and Choo and Siow (2006) imposes independence
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA).
4.2. Logit estimation of the model on pairs of couples
We propose a new way of estimating this matching model of the marriage market,
following Charbonneau’s (2014) approach to estimating logit models with two
dimensions of fixed effects.
We consider a pair of couples, Mr 1 and Mrs 1, and Mr 2 and Mrs 2 and show
that the probability that Mr 1 is with Mrs 1 and Mr 2 with Mrs 2 rather than the
opposite can be written in a logistic form.
30If we assume that education of the wife decreases the joint utility, then a positive affinity means
that it decreases utility more in marriage where the husband is uneducated. Our model does
not allow us to identify the attractiveness of each type of individual on the marriage market.
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Theorem 3. Let’s consider a pair of couples, two women w = 1 and w = 2 whose
respective husbands h(1) = h1 and h(2) = h2 are (respectively or not) m = 1 and
m = 2. if we assume that the fact that one particular man is already married does
not affect the overall probability for a woman to get married, the probability that
the couples are (1, 1) and (2, 2) rather that the opposite writes:
P(h1 = 1|{h1, h2} = exp (Φ11 + Φ22 − Φ12 − Φ21)1 + exp (Φ11 + Φ22 − Φ12 − Φ21) (11)
where Φmw is the total systematic utility generated by a match between m and w.
The proof of theorem 3 is given in appendix D. Equation (11) is easy to interpret:
Mrs 1 is more likely to be married with Mr 1 than with Mr 2 when Φ11 + Φ22 >
Φ12 + Φ21, that is the sum of the systematic utilities of matches is higher when
woman 1 is married with man 1 and woman 2 with man 2.31
We adopt parametrization Φ(x, y) = x′Ay and apply it to equation (11), which
gives, after simplification:
P(h1 = 1|{h1, h2} = {1, 2}) = exp ((x1 − x2)
′A(y1 − y2))
1 + exp ((x1 − x2)′A(y1 − y2)) (12)
To estimate the affinity matrix A, we compute the sum of the log-likelihoods
defined by (12) over a sample of potential pairs of couples — hence we estimate the
affinity matrix by maximum of pseudo-likelihood.32 Our dataset contains about
500, 000 couples: considering every possible pair of couples would mean considering
more than 1011 potential pairs, which is not feasible. In each village, we randomly
divide all couples into clusters of roughly 5 and we consider every possible pair of
couples within each cluster (10 pairs of couples per cluster).33 This procedure also
eliminates village fixed effects from the equations.
The logit in equation (12) has no constant: when x1 = x2 or y1 = y2, (h1 =
31As usual in logit models, this probability respects the property of independence of irrelevant
alternatives.
32We only consider women with different husbands, that is, we never consider two couples such
that one man is married to both women.
33The reason why the size of the cluster is not always exactly 5 is that the number of couples
per village is not always a multiple of 5. Our results are robust to considering larger clusters
of 10 couples.
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1, h2 = 2) is as likely as (h1 = 2, h2 = 1) (for the econometrician). The dependent
variable of the logit is always 1, as man 1 is always the husband of woman 1. So the
model is identified when the matching is imperfect. For example, assume education
is the only dimension of x and y. If the assortative matching on education was
perfect (the more educated man is always with the more educated woman), then
x1 − x2 and y1 − y2 would always share the same sign, and increasing A would
always increase the likelihood. However, if the matching is imperfect, there are
some couples for which x1− x2 and y1− y2 have different signs, so that increasing
A decreases the likelihood for these couples.
4.3. Endogeneity of education
Our structural model allows us to estimate the “affinity” between a certain number
of characteristics of wives and husbands. These characteristics are what we can
observe in the census: age, whether the husband is a polygamist, and education.
We are interested in the exogenous part of education, the one we instrument using
the stock of public schools in the village when the individual was of school age.
In order to take into account the endogeneity of education, we use a two-step con-
trol function approach. Rivers and Vuong (1988) prove the consistency of control
function approaches in the probit case. We are not aware of any paper focusing
on logit endogenous variables, but Wooldridge (2015) discusses control function
approaches in econometrics along a large class of models, including nonlinear de-
pendent variables in general. In this case, control function approaches require
independence between the distribution of the error terms and of the instruments.
In a first step, we estimate:
∆Ewjv = ∆Q(Awjv) + γw∆Npublic,7wjv
+ ∆Q(Awjv)× x′vθw + φw∆Nprivate,7wjv + ∆ewjv
∆Ewjv = E1jv − E2jv is the difference in female education for couple pair j in
village v, ∆Q(Awjv) is the difference in a quartic polynomial in age,34 ∆Npublic,7wjv is
the difference in the number of public schools in the village at 7 (and ∆Nprivate,7wjv
34q1(A1jv −A2jv) + q2(A21jv −A22jv) + q3(A31jv −A32jv) + q4(A41jv −A42jv)
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the difference in the number of private schools). We also interact the quartic in age
difference with a vector xv of village characteristics.35 This equation is intended to
be as close as possible to the first stage in equation (2), with a couple of caveats:
there are no village fixed effects because we consider only pairs of couples within
the same village. There are no cohort fixed effects either. Because we consider
the interactions between all characteristics of the wife and husbands, adding co-
hort fixed effects would require estimating thousands of additional coefficients (we
consider 35 different cohorts). For this reason, cohort fixed effects are replaced by
a quartic function of age.36
We estimate a similar first-step equation for men:
∆Emjv = ∆Q(Amjv) + γm∆Npublic,13mjv + λ∆Pmjv
+ ∆Q(Amjv)× x′vθm + φm∆Nprivate,13mjv + ∆emjv
∆Pmjv = P1jv − P2jv is the difference between the number of wives of husband
1 and husband 2.37
In a second step, when estimating equation (12), we consider, instead of edu-
cation of men and women, the predicted education and residuals from equations
(13) and (13), ∆Eˆw and ∆eˆw, and ∆Eˆm and ∆eˆm.38
Finally, the precision of the estimated matrix A must take into account the two-
stage procedure. The precision of A is estimated using a sandwich-like estimator
with the hessian of the joint log-likelihood
lj = log
{
Λ[∆x′jA∆yj] ϕ(eˆ2mj/σˆ2m) ϕ(eˆ2wj/σˆ2w)
}
where Λ is the cumulative of the logistic distribution, ϕ is the density of the normal
35Like in equation (2): a dummy for belonging to British Cameroon, precipitation, tempera-
ture, elevation, ruggedness and agricultural suitability, distance to the nearest 1922 railroad,
river, 1922 town, Roome mission station, 1913 German mission school, and 1913 German
government school.
36Results are robust to including a polynomial of degree 3 or 5 in age.
37Or, in another specification, the difference between a dummy equal to 1 if husband 1 is a
polygamist and a dummy equal to 1 if husband 2 is a polygamist.
38We could also have actual education ∆Em and ∆Ew and the residuals ∆eˆm and ∆eˆw. This
does not affect the affinity between education and the other characteristics, but it makes the
affinity between wife and husband education and the residuals easier to interpret.
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distribution; σˆ2m and σˆ2w are the estimated variances of eˆ2m and eˆ2w.
Because we consider a dyadic dataset of possible pairs of couples, a given couple
appears several times in the dataset and the pseudo-likelihood function, and this
needs to be taken into account in the estimation of standard errors — this is
discussed in Jochmans (2017). This does not really matter in our case because we
opt to cluster standard errors by a larger unit, the village.
4.4. Results: affinity matrices
In this section, we estimate matrices A of affinity parameters between characteris-
tics of husbands and wives. These matrices are dx by dy where dx is the number of
male attributes taken into consideration, and dy the number of female attributes.
Element akl of A is the affinity between husband’s attribute xk and wife’s attribute
y`. It is is the second derivative of the joint utility of a match with respect to xk
and y`.
In a first step, we estimate the affinity between a woman’s education and the
number of wives of her husband without taking into account the matching on
education. In this way, we replicate in the structural framework the central result
of the difference in differences estimation: educated women are more likely to be
with polygamous men. On a sample of couple pairs indexed by j, we estimate the
following equation:
Pj = Λ
[
∆x′jA∆yj
]
where the vector ∆xj contains the difference between the number of wives of hus-
band 1 and husband 2 (∆Pmjv = P1jv − P2jv), as well as a quartic polynomial
in the age difference. ∆yj is a vector containing all the ∆ variables in the first
step equation (13), as well as the residual ∆eˆwj (the control function). The main
difference with the non-structural approach is that we are able to take into account
flexibly the matching on age by including a quartic polynomial in age for both hus-
bands and wives. The wife’s vector contains 58 characteristics and the husband’s
vector contains 5, so we estimate a total of 290 parameters, most of which have
no meaningful interpretation as their role is to make the first step of the control
function approach as close as possible to the first stage of our 2sls estimation. In
table 8, we only display the meaningful affinity parameters.
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The top panel of table 8 displays the matrix A not taking into account assortative
matching on education. The first cell of the matrix displays the affinity between
the education of a wife and the number of co-wives of her husband: the affinity is
positive (0.15) and statistically significant at the 10% level. Our logit estimation
procedure on pairs of couples helps us interpret the magnitude of this affinity,
which is in fact an odds ratio (see equation 12). Let’s imagine a pair of couples
composed of a woman with zero years of education, a woman with one year of
education, a monogamous man (with zero other wives) and a polygamous man
with exactly one other wife. An affinity of 0.15 means that the educated woman
is exp(0.15) = 1.16 times more likely to be married to the polygamous man than
to the monogamous man. This is, of course, when we do not take into account
matching on education.
Table 8: Matrix A (husband’s # of wives)
Matrix A w/o taking into account matching on education
Husband Husband Husband education Other husband
# of wives education control function characteristics
Wife education 0.15* X
(0.08)
Wife education 0.01** X
control function (0.00)
Other wife X X
characteristics
Matrix A w/o taking into account matching on education
Husband Husband Husband education Other husband
# of wives education control function characteristics
Wife education 0.06 0.97*** 0.03 X
(0.09) (0.31) (0.05)
Wife education 0.01 -0.03 0.06*** X
control function (0.01) (0.07) (0.00)
Other wife X X X X
characteristics
Observations: 853,620. Each observation is a pair of couples within the same
village (women 25-60 and their husband). Standard errors clustered at the village
level in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Other husband and wife
characteristics are: number of private schools in the village at age 7 (for women) an
13 (for men), a quartic (4th degree) polynomial in age, and a quartic polynomial
in age interacted with a vector of time-invariant village variables.
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Next, we add to the vector of husbands’ characteristics ∆xj all the ∆ variables
in equation (13) and the residual ∆eˆmj (the control function). Doing so, we take
into account the matching between education of the husband and education of the
wife.39 We estimate a very strong affinity between husband and wife education
(0.97, significant at the 1% level).40 This very strong affinity reduces the affinity
between wife education and the number of wives of the husband, which is divided
by 3 and loses statistical significance. This shows that our reduced form results
was in a very large part explained by assortative matching on education and the
fact that educated men are more likely to be polygamous.
Appendix table C.4 is like table 8, but the number of wives of the husband is
replaced by a binary variable equal to 1 if the husband is a polygamist, and to 0 if
he has only one wife. Here again, the positive affinity of 0.35 we estimate between
a woman’s education and whether her husband is a polygamist is reduced (to 0.28)
when we take into account the very strong matching on education (0.96), though
it retains statistical significance at the 10% level.
Though the positive affinity between an wife’s education and her husband’s
polygamy is reduced when we take into account assortative matching on education,
it remains positive and does not fall to zero. However, because of data limitations,
we are only taking into account a limited number of dimensions of matching on the
marriage market. Notably, we have no information on income or wealth (which
could play an important role in the matching) let alone on health or personality
traits. We can only speculate on what would happen if we were able to take into
account more dimensions of the matching, and we cannot exclude the possibility
that the positive affinity between wife education and husband polygamy could in-
verse, revealing that educated women are in fact less likely to marry a polygamous
man taking as given all other dimensions of the match. Further research with
different data could tackle this question.
39The wife’s vector contains 58 characteristics, and the husband’s vector now contains 59 char-
acteristics, so we estimate a total of 3,422 affinity parameters. Again, we only display the
meaningful affinity parameters.
40Again, the logit estimation procedure on pairs of couples helps us interpret the magnitude of
this affinity. Let’s imagine a pair of couples composed of a man and a woman with zero years
of schooling, and a man and a woman with one year of schooling. An affinity of 0.97 means
that it is exp(0.97) = 2.64 times more likely that schooling level are the same within each
marriage rather than the opposite.
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4.5. Informal estimation
In this section, we show the robustness of our structural results by reproduc-
ing them in an informal estimation using only well-known linear estimators. We
want to show that the positive effect of a woman’s education on the likelihood
that she marries a polygamist are explained by her preference for other husband’s
characteristics, like education, that are correlated with being a polygamist. It is
worth stressing that this cannot be shown by controlling for husband’s education
in equation (3), even using an instrument.41 From the point of view of the woman,
the attributes of the husband are not control variables, they are other dependent
variables in the matching process.
Our informal solution to this estimation problem consists in decomposing the
dependent variable (whether the husband is a polygamist) into the parts correlated
with various other characteristics. We start by regressing a man’s polygamy on
education (instrumented by the number of public schools in the village at 13)
and all the other dependent variables of equation (3), including the cohort fixed
effects.42 We then decompose the husband’s polygamy between the residual (νˆivc),
the part of polygamy predicted by education (τˆEivc), the part predicted by the
cohort fixed effects (δˆc), and the part predicted by other variables (αˆv+x′vcφˆ). In a
second step, we estimate equation (3) putting alternatively on the left-hand side,
instead of polygamy, its different predicted components, as well as the residual.
The result of this procedure is shown in the first panel of table 9. In column
(1), we replicate the result of table 7: one additional year of schooling increases
the probability that a woman’s husband is a polygamist by 8 percentage points.43
The rest of the table shows that an additional year of education mostly increases
the part of a husband polygamy predicted by his education. The coefficient of 0.08
decomposes between a coefficient of 0.03 (not statistically significant) when we put
41Because any characteristic of the husband is a choice of the wife (or her family), it is almost
surely correlated with the error term in equation (3), even if education if exogenously received
by the man.
42This is the 2SLS estimation of table 7, panel B, column 3, but on a slightly different sample,
as we consider all married men regardless of their age.
43The estimate is slightly different from the estimate of table 7 because the sample is different:
we drop women who married an out-of district migrant (because we cannot regress polygamy
on the instrument for these men), and we drop the husbands whose age or years of schooling
are missing.
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the residual on the left-hand side and a coefficient of 0.05 (significant at the 1%
level) when we put predicted polygamy on the left-hand side (columns 2 and 3).
In columns (4) to (6), we decompose predicted polygamy into the parts predicted
by education, the cohort fixed effects, and the rest. When we put on the left hand
side the husband’s polygamy predicted by his education, the coefficient on the
wife’s years of education is 0.06 (significant at the 1% level). When we put on the
left hand side the husband’s polygamy predicted by his age (the cohort dummies),
the coefficient on years of education is actually negative (−0.02), likely because
educated women prefer younger men, and polygamy is positively correlated with
age. The bottom panel of table 9 displays the results of the exact same procedure
when we replace husband’s polygamy (a binary variable) with his number of wives.
Results are consistent with the top panel, though an additional year of schooling
seems to also increase the residual part of the husband’s number of co-wives, that
is not explained by education or age (column 2).
The results of this informal estimation procedure are fully consistent with our
structural estimation: the effect of female education on polygamy is mostly ac-
counted for by the assortative mating between female and male education. Women
often marry polygamous men because they often marry educated men who are of-
ten polygamists — or will take additional wives at some point during the marriage.
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Table 9: Results of informal estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: husband polygamous (0/1)
Husband
polygamous Husband polygamous: predicted by the IV estimation
Residual
(νˆivc) Predicted polygamy
effect of effect of other
total education cohort F.E. variables
Years of schooling 0.08** 0.03 0.05*** 0.06*** -0.02* 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Observations 460,124 460,124 460,124 460,124 460,124 460,124
Dependent variable: husband’s number of wives
Husband
# wives Husband # wives: predicted by the IV estimation
Residual
(νˆivc) Predicted polygamy
effect of effect of other
total education cohort F.E. variables
Years of schooling 0.25*** 0.15* 0.10*** 0.12*** -0.05** 0.02
(0.09) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Observations 460,124 460,124 460,124 460,124 460,124 460,124
Sample: non migrant couples excluding Yaoundé, Douala and the Bamiléké districts (women
aged 25-60 and their husbands). The sample is not exactly the same as in table 7 because 1/we
drop women who married an out-of-district migrant (because we cannot regress polygamy
on the instrument for these men), 2/ we drop the husbands whose age or years of schooling
are missing. These differences in sample explain why results are slightly different from ta-
ble 7. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01.
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5. Conclusion
Colonial education mattered for marriage markets: the wave of school construc-
tions that occurred in Cameroon after World War II changed the marriage market
outcomes of the girls who were young enough when a school opened in their vil-
lage. Not only were they more likely to be formally employed, they were also able
to marry men who were younger, more educated, and more likely to have formal
employment. At the same time, their education did not allow them to escape
polygamy. In fact, women who received public education were more likely to end
up in a polygamous marriage. We have provided evidence that this was largely
explained by assortative matching on education: educated women were able to
marry more educated men, but these educated men, because they were doing well
on the labor market, were then able to take a second wife. Though we do not
observe the exact timing of marriages, the fact that education did not affect the
age rank within marriage supports this interpretation, rather than the one where
educated women entered polygamous marriages as second or third wives.
We show that the positive affinity between a wife’s education and the number
of wives of her husband decreases when we take into account the very strong
matching on education, but our data does not allow us to take into account other
dimensions of matching on the marriage market. In particular, we do not observe
income or wealth, let alone health or personality traits. We cannot exclude the
fact that, could we take these dimensions into account, the affinity between female
education and male polygamy would turn negative. This has implications for the
literature on education and polygamy, but also more generally for the literature
on the marriage market returns to education, which needs to take into account the
role of matching on the marriage market when interpreting reduced form estimates.
Like a number of papers before us, for example Ashraf et al. (forthcoming), we
show that the effect of an educational reform is mediated by local cultural norms
and customs. In a setting when polygamous unions are frequent, it is perhaps not
that surprising that women who receive education and become more attractive
on the marriage market end up marrying polygamous men. Norms and customs,
however, can be changed by education if it is set up with the express aim of
transforming them. In Africa in general, and in Cameroon in particular, Christian
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missionaries set out the goal of promoting the monogamous model of marriage, and
our paper provides some suggestive evidence that, contrary to public education,
receiving private, Christian education decreased the likelihood for a woman to
marry a polygamist. This points towards cultural change and religious conversion
as an important channel for explaining the decline in African polygamy.
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Appendix
A. Data appendix
Temperature and precipitation. Temperature and precipitation data are from
WorldClim (http://www.worldclim.org). They are averages over the period
1950–2000.
Elevation and ruggedness. Elevation data come from NASA Shuttle Radar
Topography Mission (http://srtm.csi.cgiar.org). Ruggedness is computed
from elevation data using the slope tool in ArcGIS.
Malaria stability index. The malaria stability index comes from Kiszweski
et al. (2004) and was downloaded from https://sites.google.com/site/gordoncmccord/
/datasets.
Agricultural suitability. Agricultural suitability is suitability for rainfed crops
excluding forest ecosystems, an index ranging from 0 to 11. It comes from Global
Agro-Ecological Zones: http://webarchive.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/GAEZ/
index.htm.
Railroads in 1922. The main railroads in 1922 were a narrow-gauge line from
Victoria (now Limbe) to Soppo in British Cameroon, the Northern railway from
Douala to Nkongsamba and the Central railway from Douala to Eseka in French
Cameroon. The exact delineation of railroads comes from http://diva-gis.org.
Main rivers. Data on the location of rivers come from www.naturalearthdata.
com/downloads/10m-physical-vectors/.
Towns in 1922. Data on the location of towns in 1922/1923 come from France,
Ministère des Colonies (1922) and Great Britain, Colonial office (1923).
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Roome mission stations. The mission station map of Roome (1925) was dig-
itized by Nunn (2010) and is available at https://scholar.harvard.edu/nunn/
pages/data-0.
German mission/public schools in 1913. Data on German mission schools
and public schools in 1913 comes from Schlunk (1914) and was digitized by Dupraz
(2019). See figure A.1 below.
Figure A.1: Mission stations in Roome (1925) and schools in Schlunk (1914)
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B. Additional descriptive statistics
Figure B.1: Share of married women aged 15–60 in a polygamous union in 1976
Authors’ map from 1976 Cameroonian population census data.
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Figure B.2: Age heaping in the 1976 census
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C. Additional results
Figure C.1: Event study graphs: effect of private school openings on education
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Note: Both figures display the βprivate coefficients of equation (1), estimated separately for men
and women. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
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Figure C.2: Event study graphs: effect of public school openings on education,
including schools that opened after 1960
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Note:Both figures display the βpublic coefficients of equation (1), estimated separately for men
and women. Contrary to figure 5, we also consider the schools that opened after 1960.
Figure C.3: Selection of the age maximizing the first stage F-test
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Table C.1: Results of 2sls estimation with 2 instruments: labor market and exten-
sive margin of marriage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: women
In labor Wage Ever
force earner married Widow Divorced
OLS (with cohort and village fixed effects)
Years of schooling -0.001 0.020*** -0.023*** -0.007*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
2SLS (instruments=# public schools at 7
and # public school openings 8-13)
Years of schooling -0.020 0.034*** -0.010 -0.046** -0.025*
(0.032) (0.008) (0.014) (0.023) (0.015)
K-P F-stat 31.10 48.61 31.36 31.36 31.36
Observations 696,119 386,450 698,736 698,736 698,736
# clusters 9,213 7,307 9,214 9,214 9,214
Panel B: men
In labor Wage Ever
force earner married Widow Divorced
OLS (with cohort and village fixed effects)
Years of schooling 0.003*** 0.037*** 0.009*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
2SLS (instruments=# public schools at 7
and # public school openings 8-13)
Years of schooling 0.022 0.120*** 0.028 0.014** -0.003
(0.015) (0.040) (0.038) (0.007) (0.011)
K-P F-stat 14.45 15.42 15.34 15.34 15.34
Observations 604,931 558,430 604,670 604,670 604,670
# clusters 9,203 9,166 9,201 9,201 9,201
Sample: all non-migrant men/women aged 25-60 in 1976. Standard errors
clustered at the village level in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table C.2: Results of 2sls estimation with 2 instruments: sample of married indi-
viduals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: women
Husband’s Husband Husband Husband’s Wife Husband’s
education wage earner polygamous # of wives rank age
OLS (with cohort and village fixed effects)
Years of schooling 0.603*** 0.033*** -0.011*** -0.018*** -0.029*** -0.539***
(0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.017)
2SLS (instruments=# public schools at 7
and # public school openings 8-13)
Years of schooling 0.569*** 0.078*** 0.054* 0.217** -0.020 -1.999***
(0.115) (0.016) (0.030) (0.086) (0.077) (0.603)
K-P F-stat 40.05 43.72 39.99 39.99 40.68 40.47
Observations 491,152 451,030 490,045 490,045 498,101 491,806
# clusters 9,040 8,985 9,039 9,039 9,074 9,042
Panel B: men
Wife(s)’s Number of Wife(s)’s
education Polygamous wives age
OLS (with cohort and village fixed effects)
Years of schooling 0.286*** 0.003*** 0.008*** -0.336***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.013)
2SLS (instruments=# public schools at 7
and # public school openings 8-13)
Years of schooling 1.340*** 0.103*** 0.178** 0.044
(0.250) (0.039) (0.072) (0.541)
K-P F-stat 13.18 13.13 13.04 12.97
Observations 438,328 472,341 470,247 439,070
# clusters 9,041 9,093 9,091 9,043
Sample: all non-migrant men/women aged 25-60 in 1976. Standard errors clustered at the village
level in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table C.3: 2sls results: district-level instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: women
Wage Ever Husband’s Husband Husband’s Husband’s
Migrant earner married education polygamous # of wives age
2SLS on the full sample
Years of schooling 0.069* 0.035** -0.022** 0.460*** 0.031 0.165** -1.154**
(0.037) (0.014) (0.011) (0.110) (0.029) (0.081) (0.476)
K-P F-stat 17.25 24.31 17.21 16.29 16.37 16.37 16.34
Observations 961,810 502,693 958,629 669,448 668,088 668,088 670,435
# clusters 112 112 112 112 112 112 112
2SLS on the sample of non-migrants
Years of schooling 0.037*** -0.036*** 0.412*** 0.043* 0.211*** -1.243**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.121) (0.024) (0.074) (0.599)
K-P F-stat 28.50 30.74 25.46 25.58 25.58 25.60
Observations 387,108 698,993 491,459 490,357 490,357 492,115
# clusters 112 112 112 112 112 112
Panel B: men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Wage Ever Wife(s)’s Number of Wife(s)’s
Migrant earner married education Polygamous wives age
2SLS on the full sample
Years of schooling 0.317* 0.091 0.082 2.330 0.123 0.259 -1.932
(0.165) (0.064) (0.113) (1.570) (0.167) (0.327) (2.580)
K-P F-stat 3.62 4.36 3.61 1.75 1.43 1.40 1.76
Observations 854,308 774,653 848,307 589,253 645,505 642,724 590,339
# clusters 112 112 112 112 112 112 112
2SLS on the sample of non-migrants
Years of schooling 0.077 0.068 1.867*** 0.125 0.280 -2.083
(0.057) (0.075) (0.711) (0.083) (0.172) (1.563)
K-P F-stat 6.84 6.59 5.41 5.08 4.95 5.39
Observations 558,744 604,976 438,684 472,689 470,597 439,427
# clusters 112 112 112 112 112 112
Sample: all men/women aged 25-60 in 1976. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table C.4: Matrix A (husband polygamous)
Matrix A w/o taking into account matching on education
Husband Husband Husband education Other husband
polygamous education control function characteristics
Wife education 0.35** X
(0.16)
Wife education -0.00 X
control function (0.01)
Other wife X X
characteristics
Matrix A w/o taking into account matching on education
Husband Husband Husband education Other husband
polygamous education control function characteristics
Wife education 0.28* 0.96*** 0.04 X
(0.16) (0.30) (0.05)
Wife education 0.01 -0.03 0.06*** X
control function (0.01) (0.07) (0.00)
Other wife X X X X
characteristics
Observations: 853,620. Each observation is a pair of couples within the same village
(women 25-60 and their husband). Standard errors clustered at the village level
in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Other husband and wife
characteristics are: number of private schools in the village at age 7 (for women) an
13 (for men), a quartic (4th degree) polynomial in age, and a quartic polynomial in
age interacted with a vector of time-invariant village variables.
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D. Mathematical appendix
D.1. Proof of Theorem 1
This proof requires a few notations. For any transferable utility function following
(5) and (6), let us define:
 u(x, y, n) = u0(x, y, n)− τ(x, y, n)v(x, y, n) = v0(x, y, n) + τ(x, y, n) (13)
where τ(x, y, n) is the (positive or negative) utility transfer given by the man to
his wife of type y. pim(x, y, n) = f(x)pi(y, n|x) is the number of men of type x
who want to marry a woman of type y with n co-spouses; similarly, piw(x, y, n) =
g(y)pi(x, n|y) is the number of women of type y who want to marry a man of type
x with n co-spouses. There is an equilibrium when pim(x, y, n) − piw(x, y, n) = 0.
pim(x, y, n) and piw(x, y, n) are continuous functions of τ(x, y, n). Besides, for every
(x, n, y):  limτ(x,y,n)→+∞ pim(x, y, n)− piw(x, y, n) = 0− g(y)limτ(x,y,n)→−∞ pim(x, y, n)− piw(x, y, n) = f(x)− 0 (14)
Thus, the generalization of the intermediate values theorem to the multidimen-
sional case, the Poincaré-Miranda theorem, proves there is a solution to the prob-
lem pim − piw = 0. (Technically, the Poincaré-Miranda theorem applies only to
bounded sets. However, changing the variable to τ ′ = tanh−1(τ) trivially solves
this issue.)
D.2. Proof of Lemma 1
From equation (7), we can write the probability for a man to be married with a
woman of type y and nY other wives:
pi(y, nY |x) =
∑
Y ′∈Y,y∈Y ′,n′Y =nY exp (U(x, Y
′))∑
Y ′∈Y exp (U(x, Y ′))
=
exp(u(x, y, nY ))
∑
Y ′∈Y,y /∈Y ′,n′Y =nY exp
(∑
y′∈Y ′ u(x, y′, n′Y )
)
∑
Y ′∈Y exp (U(x, Y ′))
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We assume that the chances to marry a spouse of type y are small for any
number of spouses nY + 1. This implies the set of spouses type is large enough. A
consequence of this is, for any nY :
∑
Y ′∈Y,y∈Y ′,n′Y =nY exp
(∑
y′∈Y ′ u(x, y′, n′Y )
)
∑
Y ′∈Y,n′Y =nY exp
(∑
y′∈Y ′ u(x, y′, n′Y )
) ≈ 0
∑
Y ′∈Y,y /∈Y ′,n′Y =nY exp
(∑
y′∈Y ′ u(x, y′, n′Y )
)
∑
Y ′∈Y,n′Y =nY exp
(∑
y′∈Y ′ u(x, y′, n′Y )
) ≈ 1
So that
pi(y, nY |x) =
exp (u(x, y, nY ))
∑
Y ′∈Y,n′Y =nY exp
(∑
y′∈Y ′ u(x, y′, n′Y )
)
∑
Y ′∈Y exp (U(x, Y ′))
And we can write the number of matches pi(x, y, nY ) in two ways, as a function of
males’ utility and as a function of females’ utility: pi(x, y, nY ) = f(x)pi(y, nY |x) =
g(y)pi(x, nY |y), where f(x) is the density of x and g(y) is the density of y.
pi(x, y, nY ) = exp (u(x, y, nY )− a(x, nY )) (15)
= exp (v˜(x, y, nY )− b(y)) (16)
where a(x, nY ) = log (
∑
Y ′∈Y exp (U(x, Y ′)))−log
(∑
Y ′∈Y,n′Y =nY exp
(∑
y′∈Y ′ u(x, y′, n′Y )
))
−
log f(x) and b(y) = log∑(x,nY )∈X×IN exp (v˜(x, y, nY ))− log g(y).
Taking the square root of the product of (15) and (16), we obtain the the
matching function:
pi(x, y, nY ) = exp
(
Φ(x, y, nY )− b(y)− a(x, nY )
2
)
D.3. Proof of Theorem 2
This proof follows two steps: the first step explains why equation (10) is necessary
to have an equilibrium. It requires only a recall of a few elements from the main
text. The second part explains why equation (10) defines exactly one distribution
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for every distribution g(y) and f(x, nY ).
(10) is necessary for any equilibrium. Indeed, equations (15) and (16) are
clearly necessary as they follow from the multinomial logit following the model,
and they imply (10).
There is a single distribution following (10) This step proves that, for
every distribution g(y) and f(x, nY ), there are several vectors a and b that define
a distribution following (10); but each of these vectors defines the same distribution
pi(x, y, nY ).
Firstly, let us introduce the notation φ = exp Φ2 , and let a be the vector of all
the a(x, nY ), and b be the vector of all the b(y).
It is possible to write the density g(y) as a function of a and b:
g(y) =
∑
x,n
φ(x, y, n) exp((−a(x, n)− b(y))/2) (17)
By(a) := exp(−b(y)/2) = g(y)∑
x,n φ(x, y, n) exp(−a(x, n)/2)
(18)
∂By(a)
∂a(x, n) =
By(a)pia(x, y, n)
2g(y) (19)
where pia(x, y, n) := φ(x, y, n) exp(−a(x, n)/2)By(a) is the number of matches of
type x, n, y implied by a and the accountability of women in (17). Similarly,
pia(x, n) =
∑
y pia(x, y, n) is the number of males of type x, n implied by a.
We search for the vectors a ∈ IRk such that pia(x, n) = f(x, n) for every (x, n),
and we show that all the solutions lead to the same density.44
Firstly, there is always a vector a that solves pia(x, n) = f(x, n) for every (x, n).
Indeed, pia(x, n) is a continuous function of a and for every (x, n): lima(x,n)→+∞ pia(x, n) = 0lima(x,n)→−∞ pia(x, n) = ∑y g(y) = 1 (20)
Thus, the generalization of the intermediate values theorem to the multidimen-
sional case, the Poincaré-Miranda theorem, proves there is a solution to the prob-
44k is the number of points on the support of x, n
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lem. (Technically, the Poincaré-Miranda theorem applies only to bounded sets.
However, changing the variable to a′ = tanh−1(a) trivially solves this issue.)
Secondly, let us study the gradient of pia(x, n). The partial derivatives of pia are:
∂pia(x, n)
∂a(x, n) =
1
2
∑
y
(
−1 + pia(x, y, n)
g(y)
)
pia(x, y, n) (21)
when x′ 6= x or y′ 6= y:
∂pia(x, n)
∂a(x′, n′) =
1
2
∑
y
pia(x′, y, n′)
g(y) pia(x, y, n) (22)
Let u = (u(x, n)) be a vector that defines a direction in the space of the vector a.
Then:
gradpia(x, n) · u = −12
∑
y
pia(x, y, n)
u(x, n)−∑
x′,n′
u(x′, n′)pia(x
′, y, n′)
g(y)
 (23)
Here, ∑x′,n′ u(x′, n′)pia(x′,y,n′)g(y) is the weighted average of the u(x′, n′), where the
weights follow the distribution of the x′, n′ conditional on y implied by a. Two
cases emerge:
• For every x, n, u(x, n) = α ∈ IR. gradfx,n(a) · u = 0: the densities are
unchanged for a variation of a in this direction. The reason is the following:
if a(x, n) increase by α for every x, n and b(y) decrease by α for every y,
equation (10) is unchanged.
• u(x, n) depends on x, n. u has a dimension xm, nm (or several dimensions)
such that u(xm, nm) is maximal. In this dimension, the sign of (23) is con-
stant. u(xm, nm) > u(x, n) for some x, n, and gradfxm,nm(a) · u < 0. For any
line of the space following the direction defined by u, there is exactly one
point such that fxm,nm(a) = pi(xm, nm). So there is at most one point such
that fx,n(a) = pi(x, n) for every (x, n).
So for every line of the space, there is at most single density following equation
(10), g(y) and f(x, n). There cannot be several densities over IRk (IRk is a star
domain).
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D.4. Proof of Theorem 3
We start by writing P (m,w) the probability that man m of type xm is matched
with woman w of type yw. Given the independence between the sympathy shocks,
each match of type (x, y) is equiprobable, which means that P (m,w) is simply:
P(m,w) = pi(xm, yw)
NxmNyw
= exp (Φ(xm, yw)− am − bw) (24)
where Nxm and Nyw are respectively the density of men of type xm and the
density of women of type yw. We add some flexibility in the model here, in the
sense that am and bw are sets of individual fixed effects, that need not be fully
determined by x and y.
Given that woman w is married, the probability for her husband (denoted h(w))
to be man m is:
P(h(w) = m) = P(m,w)∑
m′ P(m′, w)
= exp (Φ(xm, yw)− am)∑
m′ exp (Φ(xm′ , yw)− am′)
And her probability to marry man m given that she’s married in a set of men S
is:
P(h(w) = m|h(w) ∈ S) = exp (Φ(xm, yw)− am)∑
m′∈S exp (Φ(xm′ , yw)− am′)
(25)
Let us now consider a pair of couples, two women w = 1 and w = 2 whose
respective husbands h(1) = h1 and h(2) = h2 are (respectively or not) m = 1 and
m = 2. We are interested in the probability that the couples are (1, 1) and (2, 2)
rather than the opposite. This probability writes:
P(h1 = 1|{h1, h2} = {1, 2}) =
P(h1 = 1, h2 = 2)
P(h1 = 1, h2 = 2) + P(h1 = 2, h2 = 1)
(26)
To simplify notations, let’s denote Φ11 = Φ(x1, y1),Φ12 = Φ(x1, y2). From equation
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(25) and Bayes’ rule, we have:
P(h1 = 1, h2 = 2) =
exp (Φ11 − a1)∑
m′ exp (Φ(xm′ , y1)− am′)
exp (Φ22 − a2)∑
m′ 6=1 exp (Φ(xm′ , y2)− am′)
Similarly, we can write P(h1 = 2, h2 = 1). If we assume that
∑
m′ 6=1 exp(Φ(xm′ ,y2)−am′ )∑
m′ 6=2 exp(Φ(xm′ ,y2)−am′ )
is sufficiently close to 1 (which means that the fact that one particular man is
already married hardly affects the overall probability for a woman to get married),
then the probability (26) simplifies and we have:
P(h1 = 1|{h1, h2} = {1, 2}) = exp (Φ11 + Φ22)exp (Φ11 + Φ22) + exp (Φ12 + Φ21)
= exp (Φ11 + Φ22 − Φ12 − Φ21)1 + exp (Φ11 + Φ22 − Φ12 − Φ21)
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